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ESSAY
The Responsibility to Protect:
Locating Norm Entrepreneurship
Cristina G. Stefan Q1
T
he year  marks the twentieth anniversary of The Responsibility to
Protect report, issued by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in . September  marked exactly
twenty years since the government of Canada set up the ICISS, the ad hoc
commission that produced the report. This initiative points to Canada as one of
the first RtoP norm entrepreneurs. Thanks to the sustained efforts of a variety
of norm entrepreneurs—ranging from individuals to states—RtoP was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the “ World Summit
Outcome” document (WSOD). As such,  marked a second major RtoP anni-
versary, namely fifteen years since its institutionalization at the United Nations
(UN). In the twenty years since its emergence in the  Responsibility to
Protect report, RtoP has become part of the global diplomatic language invoked
by states, NGOs, and international and regional organizations, and it is now an
established international norm. These anniversaries present an occasion to assess
the success of RtoP norm entrepreneurship efforts over the last two decades, as
well as to compare early norm entrepreneurship efforts to more recent ones.
This contribution starts by examining some of the key norm entrepreneurs who
dedicated significant resources to advancing the RtoP framework in its early years,
including individual leaders and state champions. Some early examples of indis-
pensable norm entrepreneurs with enough drive and motivation to advance the
RtoP agenda at the international level include Western middle powers, such as
Canada and some European Union member states. The subsequent sections will
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discuss whether these initial RtoP champions have continued to invest resources
and moral leadership into transforming RtoP into a sustainable prevention agenda
or if a new set of norm entrepreneurs emerged in the changing global order. In the
course of addressing such questions, we must consider the challenges posed by the
political, military, and economic transformations that have occurred since RtoP’s
adoption at the UN sixteen years ago. Those challenges include the global finan-
cial crisis, instability related to the Arab Spring and the military interventions in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya; the significant displacement and refugee crisis; the
economic and political rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
(BRICS); and an increase in countries subscribing to nationalistic and xenophobic
foreign policy agendas rather than liberal ones. These challenges have multiplied
during the COVID- pandemic, which is likely to increase the vulnerability of
the least protected populations around the world and to aggravate the risk of
atrocity crimes in those areas where atrocities are still committed with impunity.
The second section of the essay examines contributions to RtoP by both
Western and non-Western norm entrepreneurs since the norm’s endorsement
at the UN in . It also discusses the different ways in which norm entrepre-
neurship has been used in conjunction with RtoP over the last fifteen years or
so. Norm entrepreneurship from the Global South is particularly important in
the context of a changing world order, as it challenges the criticism that the
RtoP framework and its implementation is a Western concept.
This essay then asks: Who are the norm entrepreneurs with enough drive,
moral leadership, and resources to keep RtoP on the international agenda during
these trying times? The last section considers this question when discussing two
recent and unexpected non-Western norm entrepreneurs, the governments of
Qatar and Egypt. Both of these unexpected RtoP champions highlight prevention
as the single focus of RtoP, going forward. I argue that the drive and adaptability
manifested by these non-Western norm entrepreneurs with regional ambitions
increase the legitimacy of the RtoP norm itself.
Who Were the First RtoP Norm Entrepreneurs?
The literature on international agenda setting and normative progress points to
specific actors, such as individuals, civil society, and nongovernmental groups,
that seize windows of political opportunity to convince states to agree to new stan-





































2 Cristina g Stefan
definition, Canada can be viewed as an example of state-led norm entrepreneur-
ship through its role in developing and promoting RtoP in its infant years.
Canada’s efforts in this sense helped advance RtoP toward its current status as
an established international norm, despite some lingering controversies surround-
ing the use of force.
In order to understand how RtoP became an international norm, one needs to
consider first and foremost the role that the ICISS played as a norm entrepreneur.
The Canadian government appointed the ICISS “to wrestle with the whole range
of questions—legal, moral, operational, and political—rolled up in this [humani-
tarian intervention] debate, to consult with the widest possible range of opinion
around the world, and to bring back a report that would help . . . find some
new common ground.” As a demand-driven commission, the ICISS demon-
strated intellectual leadership in reconceptualizing the contentious notion of
humanitarian intervention into the RtoP framework. The commission worked
to ensure that the research and ideas in the resulting report would build political
momentum to advance the RtoP principle by shipping thirty thousand free copies
around the world, including it in ministerial speeches, and keeping the issue on
the agenda of multilateral and regional fora. In the ICISS’s reconceptualization,
RtoP encompassed respect for both state sovereignty and human rights, with
the latter reflected in guidelines to prevent and halt atrocities amounting to geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
Individual norm entrepreneurs can play a critical role when a new norm
emerges, and RtoP was no exception. After the release of the Responsibility to
Protect report, several individuals, including the co-chairs of the commission, dis-
played moral leadership in promoting the new RtoP principle in international,
regional, and national fora. The two co-chairs, reflective of the balanced compo-
sition of the commission, were Mohamed Sahnoun, the late Algerian diplomat
representing the Global South, and Gareth Evans, the Australian diplomat repre-
senting the Global North. Sahnoun and Evans mobilized a global public to iden-
tify the responsibility to protect against mass atrocity crimes as the responsibility
of all states, and they articulated this responsibility as central to maintaining inter-
national peace and security.
The work of the ICISS built on existing ideas, particularly those from the
African continent. This was in no small part the result of previous individual
norm entrepreneurship and moral leadership on the part of African diplomats,





































the responsibility to protect 3
an African contribution to global human rights. Conceptually, RtoP also captures
another notion coined by the South Sudanese diplomat and scholar Francis Deng,
namely the notion of “sovereignty as responsibility.” This conceptual clarification
insists on reframing sovereignty as a form of responsibility toward a state’s pop-
ulation and is fundamental to the meaning of the RtoP.
Gareth Evans has also remained one of the most vocal supporters of RtoP since
his role as ICISS co-chair concluded. He further promoted RtoP when serving on
the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, convened by then–
UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to identify ways in which the UN could respond
more efficiently to challenges to international peace and security. At every oppor-
tunity, Evans used the UN as an organizational platform for promoting RtoP by
employing language that resonated with different constituencies.
Kofi Annan is another example of an effective individual norm entrepreneur
and champion of RtoP. As the UN secretary-general, Annan personally supported
the ICISS and its findings and proved essential for keeping the RtoP principle on
the UN agenda. He was instrumental in advancing RtoP at the UN, and he did so
against the opposition of every one of his senior advisors, who recommended
moving away from what was regarded as a very contentious agenda. During the
difficult negotiations that preceded the World Summit, the meetings he orga-
nized with permanent representatives proved key to keeping RtoP on the agenda
and getting it into the WSOD. Annan’s early support for RtoP as the UN
secretary-general cemented the UN as the primary organizational platform for
launching and advancing it further onto its normative track. Annan’s successor
as UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, also kept RtoP on the UN agenda after
his departure. Ban consolidated RtoP within the UN bureaucracy by referring
to its implementation as one of his priorities as secretary-general and by making
two appointments to “translate” RP into practice. First, in May  he
appointed Francis Deng as his special adviser for the prevention of genocide
and then upgraded his position to under-secretary general. Then in February
 he appointed scholar Edward C. Luck as his special adviser on the
Responsibility to Protect, at the level of assistant secretary-general.
In addition to individuals, states can also act as norm entrepreneurs. As noted
earlier, Canada acted as a norm entrepreneur when it heeded Kofi Annan’s 
call to find a compromise on humanitarian intervention. Canada invested time,
money, and reputation in the RtoP campaign prior to its  inclusion in the





































4 Cristina g Stefan
that such rhetoric was included in declarations, official documents, political state-
ments, and placed on the agendas of workshops and conferences on security.
Canadian initiatives were directed toward convincing a critical mass of actors to
embrace RtoP in the lead up to the World Summit. Such efforts included per-
sonal phone calls made by then–Canadian prime minister Paul Martin to the five
heads of the strongest opponents to RtoP in the UNGA to win their support.
Another important factor that influenced the adoption of RtoP in the WSOD is
the support for the principle from key African countries, such as South Africa,
Rwanda, and Tanzania. In the General Assembly, Rwanda and South Africa
argued that RtoP was not a Western interventionist concept, but one that per-
tained to protection in general and was thus needed to deal with problems in
Africa. To prepare for the first UNGA debate on the topic of the Responsibility
to Protect in , a coalition of supportive states created the Group of Friends
of the Responsibility to Protect in New York, and Rwanda was one of its initial
co-chairs. The African roots of RtoP carry more weight once we focus on devel-
opments at the regional level. The African Union was the first organization to
include the right to intervene in a member state where there are mass atrocity sit-
uations occurring that are covered by RtoP in Article (h) of the AU’s Constitutive
Act of , and again in its  Ezulwini Consensus.
Challenges in Championing RtoP in a Changing Global
Order
After the UNGA unanimously adopted RtoP in , the following decade only
witnessed a handful of notable RtoP leadership initiatives, globally. Were the
Western states that had previously acted as indispensable norm entrepreneurs
during RtoP’s early years of existence still displaying norm entrepreneurship dur-
ing this time? Or, rather, was it non-Western contributions that further advanced
the RtoP agenda? This query is not meant to position the debate over RtoP as a
North-South or Western vs. non-Western issue, though as Ramesh Thakur notes,
“There are risks of it turning into one if the legitimate concerns of emerging pow-
ers are neglected by a declining West.” Instead, it aims to consider recent devel-
opments that point toward what scholars dub the crisis of the Western-dominated
liberal international order. This was not anticipated in the early years of RtoP.
The years following RtoP’s  endorsement at the UN appeared promising,





































the responsibility to protect 5
capacity building in regional and subregional fora, and dozens of states across the
globe appointing RtoP focal points at national levels. An RtoP focal point is a
senior official within a government who facilitates national mechanisms for atroc-
ity prevention and promotes international cooperation by participating in the
Global Network of RtoP focal points. By appointing an RtoP focal point at a
senior level of government, states signal their commitment to engage with RtoP
and its implementation. The primary focus of these various RtoP efforts was
on the prevention of atrocities, as opposed to simply reacting to conflicts and
atrocities. A major test for RtoP came in  with the debates surrounding
the NATO-led intervention in Libya. Out of these debates and the ensuing back-
lash against the implementation of the intervention came one of the most notable
examples of norm entrepreneurship on RtoP since , in the form of Brazil’s
Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) initiative.
Resolution  on Libya passed on March , , marking the first time the
Security Council approved the use of force against a functioning state using the
language of RtoP, under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Brazil, an elected UN Security Council member that year, abstained in this
vote, expressing concerns over operative paragraph  of the resolution, which
includes the “all necessary measures” provision. During the UN General
Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect on July
, , Brazil criticized how RtoP’s pillar three was implemented in Libya
and warned against using such mandates as an excuse for regime change. The
Brazilian ambassador to the UN at the time, Maria Luiza Viotti, argued that “cau-
tion and moderation are the best advisers” when implementing pillar three of
RtoP and that “we must exercise responsibility as we protect.” In opening the
general debate of the UNGA’s sixty-sixth session on September , ,
Brazil’s then-president, Dilma Rousseff, asked for further discussion of the
“responsibility in protecting alongside the responsibility to protect.”
This presidential discourse points to another example of individual norm entre-
preneurship that influenced Brazil’s drive to engage with RtoP and to clarify
its implementation. Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Brazil’s former
minister of external relations, is the architect of the RwP concept. Among
other challenges, he had to overcome resistance in the presidential office. In
response to President Rousseff’s query as to why she should refer to RtoP in
her opening statement at the th Session of the United Nations General





































6 Cristina g Stefan
his reasoning behind RwP. This was subsequently taken up by Ambassador
Viotti, Brazil’s permanent representative to the UN, during the Security Council
open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on November ,
, in a statement delivered on behalf of the foreign minister of Brazil, Patriota.
A concept paper entitled “Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the
Development and Promotion of a Concept,” which served as the annex to a let-
ter addressed to the UN secretary-general dated November , , included all
the proposed RwP elements. This paper framed the clarification “while protecting”
that would mark Brazil’s lasting legacy on RtoP, and implicitly be Ambassador
Patriota’s normative stamp. Brazil promoted RwP at the UN in following years,
especially once the country became a key member of the cross-regional group
that worked on a draft UNGA resolution to celebrate RtoP’s tenth anniversary.
While this resolution did not materialize, it is notable that Brazil was invited to
be part of this eight-state cross-regional group because of its leadership and visi-
bility on RwP, as well as for being viewed as representing non-Western constitu-
encies on these issues.
Arguably, what is needed to advance the RtoP norm globally is greater
non-Western engagement with this agenda. Brazil led this engagement by example
through its involvement in this cross-regional group tasked with producing a
General Assembly resolution on RtoP. Prior to that, in another example of
non-Western entrepreneurial leadership, Guatemala introduced the first UNGA
resolution on RtoP, cosponsored by sixty-seven states and adopted twelve years
ago, on September , . Guatemala has subsequently displayed leadership
on other issues related to international peace and security at the UN, as when
chairing the secretary-general’s Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the 
Review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. This important review exercise
informed subsequent UN policy, including the  report “Peacebuilding and
Sustaining Peace” by the current UN secretary-general, António Guterres. The
AGE’s report for the  review of the UN peacebuilding architecture, entitled
“The Challenge of Sustaining Peace,” suggested that “sustaining peace” must
run through the complete cycle of UN engagement, from preventive action, to
deployment, to subsequent drawdown of peace operations, and beyond to post-
conflict reconstruction.
Norm entrepreneurship can also take other forms than developing, advancing,
and sponsoring norms, such as leading, and encouraging, efforts toward criminal





































the responsibility to protect 7
Myanmar at the International Court of Justice alleging that Myanmar had carried
out mass murder, rape, and destruction of communities in Rakhine State. The
Gambia, a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, drafted the
claim against Myanmar in order to “send a clear message to Myanmar and to
the rest of the international community that the world must not stand by and
do nothing in the face of terrible atrocities that are occurring around us.” The
Gambia’s vice president described her state as “a small country with a big voice
on matters of human rights on the continent and beyond.”
These examples point to some of the new RtoP champions that have emerged
since its endorsement at the UN in , as new loci of entrepreneurial agency on
RtoP, different from the very active Western norm entrepreneurs who had initially
displayed strong leadership on RtoP, as had been the case with Canada. In recent
years, many of the initial norm champions have not identified RtoP or atrocity
prevention as one of their foreign policy priorities. Indeed, European countries
have shown greater commitment to conflict and atrocity prevention through
development assistance and mediation. Some of the more recent norm entrepre-
neurs prioritize preventive strategies that focus on addressing the root causes of
conflict, preventive diplomacy, and conflict management and resolution, without
necessarily referencing RtoP per se.
Unlike Canada, some European countries that had promoted RtoP before 
continued their work as Western norm entrepreneurs. One example of a collective
European commitment to RtoP came in , when the European Parliament
produced the most substantive European statement on RtoP to date, which called
for consensus and coordination on RtoP across the European Union. The EU has
been the only regional organization to contribute to each of the annual UNGA
interactive dialogues on RtoP to date, since the first one in . The EU was
also the first regional organization—and the only one in the world until


—to appoint an RtoP focal point, at a very senior level in the organization.
Indeed, Christian Leffler, who acted as the EU’s RtoP focal point from when the
position was first created at the EU level in  up until his retirement in March
, was the deputy secretary-general of the European External Action Service
(EEAS). This marked an important display of collective endorsement of the
RtoP norm. In addition to the organization’s RtoP main focal point, the EU
also has a very active group of RtoP focal points in its individual member states.
As Gareth Evans argued, there is great potential for the EU to implement RtoP





































8 Cristina g Stefan
Europe and because of the large set of practical instruments and policies on pre-
vention and rebuilding that it possesses. In January , the EEAS launched the
“Atrocity Prevention Toolkit,” the most comprehensive policy document to refer-
ence RtoP, which was designed to support EU practitioners through specific
hands-on knowledge of how they can contribute to atrocity prevention.
The intervention in Libya demonstrated that it is desirable, for legitimacy rea-
sons, to engage the emerging and regional powers in redefining the conduct of
RtoP interventions, for the benefit of both the emerging powers and their regional
interests alongside Western RtoP supporters. However, action in Libya was fol-
lowed by inaction and failures to protect in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, South
Sudan, and elsewhere. Scholars and practitioners have dubbed the failure of the
international community to stop atrocities and ameliorate the complex humani-
tarian emergency in Syria as an instance of the disintegrating liberal world
order. Non-Western norm entrepreneurship becomes particularly important
in the context of the changing world order, as it responds to the criticism that
the RtoP framework and its implementation is Western.
Recent Non-Western Championing Efforts: Emphasizing
RtoP’s Focus on Prevention
In the last decade, scholars such as John Ikenberry have argued that “the old order
dominated by the United States and Europe” is being replaced by one that is grad-
ually shared more and more with non-Western rising powers. As contestation
from the Global South has steadily increased, international cooperation around
liberal values and norms such as RtoP has been reduced, as shown by Brexit
and Donald Trump’s presidency. If “the crisis of the liberal order is a crisis of
legitimacy and social purpose,” it becomes paramount to turn our attention to
instances where key non-Western states have exhibited strong leadership on issues
traditionally regarded as liberal norms, which are often associated—incorrectly, in
the case of RtoP—with Western champions.
The following two examples point to the increasing role of non-Western states
in global governance and in the promotion of prevention measures to protect the
most vulnerable. These examples contain two contextual observations on what
might boost the display of leadership in regard to the latter. First, we notice
that small states can gather enough drive and financial resources to become cham-





































the responsibility to protect 9
Second, we see that giving non-Western states a visible regional or international
platform allows them to display leadership in reframing prevention. Recent
emphasis on atrocity prevention as the key component of RtoP refocuses attention
on pillars one and two of the RtoP framework. Pillar one refers to a state’s respon-
sibilities to protect its population and derives from existing international legal
obligations. This includes a state’s responsibility to build national resilience and
to address the root causes of atrocity crimes. Pillar two refers to the commitment
of the international community, including states, the UN, regional and subre-
gional organizations, and civil society to assist states in meeting their pillar one
responsibilities.
Qatar is a notable example of the non-Western efforts to advance atrocity pre-
vention as the key component of RtoP amid a shifting global order. Qatar is cur-
rently one of the co-chairs of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect,
a group that includes over fifty states from across the globe and the European
Union. The Group of Friends meets regularly both in New York and Geneva to
discuss transnational concerns related to RtoP and atrocity prevention. Qatar
has displayed entrepreneurial drive in several key initiatives both in New York
and Geneva.
Qatar has also recently worked closely with three other non-Western states
(Costa Rica, Morocco, and Peru) to consolidate the role of the UN Human
Rights Council in Geneva in advancing the RtoP framework. The Human
Rights Council adopted its first-ever thematic resolution on the Responsibility
to Protect in July  entitled, “Fifteenth Anniversary of the Responsibility to
Protect Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes
against Humanity, as Enshrined in the World Summit Outcome of .”
While this resolution came after fifty country-specific and thematic Human
Rights Council resolutions referring to RtoP, including on South Sudan, Syria,
and transitional justice, this was the first Human Rights Council thematic resolu-
tion on RtoP since the  UNGA resolution. And it was the result of diplomatic
efforts and leadership from the core group within the Group of Friends of the
Responsibility to Protect, which includes Qatar.
In other international settings, including during the ministerial event organized
on the sidelines of the opening of the th United Nations General Assembly in
New York, Qatar offered its support for “all international efforts to protect civil-
ians in countries facing armed conflict,” while describing RtoP as “the first line of





































10 Cristina g Stefan
intent on sending a message that the international community is committed to
civilian protection, to ending atrocity crimes and impunity, and to holding
accountable those responsible for atrocity crimes.
Given the increasing rate of atrocity crimes both in terms of numbers and geo-
graphic scope, Qatar is investing resources to develop partnerships at the regional
and international levels to implement the responsibility to protect. Qatar describes
this as “conducive to strengthening regional and international peace and secur-
ity.” By actively pursuing diplomatic initiatives within its sphere of influence
to address the failure of implementing RtoP to fully prevent atrocity crimes,
Qatar is a remarkable example of a small state using strategic considerations in
the cause of “overcoming smallness.” The country increases its impact on the
regional system and beyond though its foreign policy committed to championing
atrocity prevention and the RP framework. As a small state bordering the aspir-
ing regional hegemon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar is pursuing a foreign policy that also
safeguards its sovereignty. At the same time, allegations have also emerged that
Qatar backs some of the region’s most destabilizing forces and that it financially
supports international terrorist groups. Scholars such as Aidan Hehir have fur-
ther argued that Qatar is engaging in systematic human rights violations domes-
tically, despite expressing its commitment to RtoP. While such concerns need to
be considered in tandem with Qatar’s more explicit actions on RtoP, the contri-
butions a small state like Qatar can make to champion the RtoP norm—and to
broader international prevention and protection efforts—illustrate the power of
agents willing to invest financial and diplomatic resources to secure their regional
legitimacy.
When countries from the Global South are given a visible platform, at either the
international or regional level, as was the case when Brazil had a seat at the UN
Security Council table in , they are given the space to display leadership
and show initiative. As mentioned above, Brazil used this international platform
to create a more constructive dialogue about prevention within the noncoercive
pillars of the RtoP. Similarly, when Egypt held the presidency of the African
Union in , it used this as an opportunity to put forward its proposal to
approach prevention not as a threat to state sovereignty but rather as a “sover-
eignty enhancer.” And Egypt introduced its proposal for African states to
“own the prevention agenda” at the inaugural meeting of the Aswan Forum
under the theme “An Agenda for Sustainable Peace, Security and Development
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chairman of the African Union, while holding the regional body’s presidency, pro-
vided Egypt the platform to showcase this proposal. Egypt argued that the preven-
tion agenda, when nationally owned, “becomes a sovereignty enhancer,” and that
acting preventively entails fostering systems that create incentives for peaceful and
cooperative behavior.
Approaching prevention from the angle proposed by Egypt could diminish the
interventionist impulse still in the minds of some RtoP supporters, an impulse
that has been detrimental to the credibility of RtoP in the African region. This
Egyptian proposal clarifies how responsibilities for atrocity prevention and protec-
tion provide value for both vulnerable populations and state sovereignty. Although
the document that emerged from the Aswan Forum is not a consensus declara-
tion, it is nonetheless a summary provided by the host country that details the
advantages of subscribing to Egypt’s idea of prevention as a sovereignty enhancer
in the African context.
In line with individual leadership and champions of RtoP mentioned earlier,
the Egyptian initiative was led by an individual norm entrepreneur,
Ambassador Ihab Awad, who was Egypt’s deputy assistant foreign minister for
UN affairs at the time. Awad had previously been exposed to the UN’s “sustaining
peace” initiative and the need to prioritize atrocity prevention while working at
the UN Secretariat in New York for eight years. This included his work with Oscar
Fernandez-Taranco, the current assistant secretary-general for peacebuilding sup-
port, in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Such exposure informed his posi-
tion that prevention should be approached as something that enhances a state’s
own sovereignty and capacity to deal early on with tensions, before they threaten
to degenerate into open conflict or atrocities committed against certain groups,
rather than as an entry point for outside interference into a state’s internal affairs.
While Egypt needs to invest further resources to convince developing states from
areas of the world subject to instability that prevention is a sovereignty enhancer,
it displayed leadership in putting forward this proposal in a regional setting.
Qatar and Egypt are two recent examples that show how non-Western states
can, and do, enhance their regional leadership and legitimacy by finding solutions
to one of the most serious global problems of our time, namely the prevention of
mass atrocities. States from regions of the world where addressing conflict is par-
amount can invest financial and diplomatic resources to champion human-rights
protection norms, such as RtoP. As the cases in this essay have shown, when a
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the case with Brazil while on the UN Security Council) or regionally (as was the
case with Egypt while acting as chairman of the African Union), that state has
room to display initiative and drive to champion the preventive elements of
RtoP. The adaptability and mobilization efforts of these unexpected,
non-Western RtoP norm entrepreneurs can only increase the legitimacy of the
RtoP norm itself. This is because their contributions carry the highest potential
to address the legitimacy deficit of norms such as RtoP. We know that norms
spread faster if the responsibility for their creation and promotion is more broadly
shared, and if their tenets are reflective of both Western and non-Western per-
spectives and interests. When non-Western states such as Brazil, Qatar, and
Egypt are able to claim agency in developing and championing prevention and
protection norms such as RtoP, they can acquire a strong voice in a realm that
was, until recently, perceived as the exclusive domain of Western powers.
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Abstract: As part of the roundtable “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order:
Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this essay examines the issue of norm entrepreneurship as it
has been used in conjunction with the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), twenty years after the emer-
gence of The Responsibility to Protect report produced by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It examines norm entrepreneurs with enough drive,
motivation, and resources to keep RtoP on the international agenda in a changing world order,
after Western middle powers, such as Canada and some European Union member states, had pre-
viously acted as indispensable norm entrepreneurs. An examination of both Western and non-
Western entrepreneurship efforts to date reveals three key observations. First, RtoP champions
are now facing additional challenges in today’s transitional global order, where nationalistic foreign
policy agendas are replacing liberal agendas, such as RtoP. Second, the drive and adaptability of
non-Western norm entrepreneurs with regional ambitions mean that small states can emerge as
rather-unexpected RtoP champions. Third, giving non-Western states a visible regional or interna-
tional platform allows them to display leadership in reframing prevention under the RtoP frame-
work. The last two observations point to the increasing role of non-Western states in global
governance and in the promotion of prevention measures to protect the most vulnerable, which
in turn increases the legitimacy of the RtoP norm itself.
Keywords: Responsibility to Protect norm entrepreneurs, prevention, non-Western norm entrepre-
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